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A PARADOX OF OMNISCIENCE AND 
SOME ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION1 
Alfred J. Stenner 
A paradox is constructed employing four languages Ll-L4, such that Ll is a metalanguage 
for L3, L3 for L2, and L2 for Ll; L4 functions as the semantic meta-metalanguage for each 
of Ll-L3. The paradox purports to show that no omniscient being can exist, given that 
there is a set of true sentences (each true within its respective language) from Ll, L2, and 
L3 that no omniscient being can believe. 
The remainder of the paper consists in an examination of some attempts at challenging 
the paradox on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic grounds. Just which of these attempts 
are the most promising for the religious person is a question which is left open. 
I 
The late Henry Leonard liked to titillate his graduate students with the following 
question: on the assumption that God is omniscient, is the expression 'God 
believes that ' a truth-functional operator? Since a truth-functional 
operator is one that operates on one or more sentences to produce another sentence 
whose truth is solely dependent on the truth-value(s) of the former, the question, at 
first blUSh, appears to have a relatively straightforward answer. If x is omniscient, 
then x believes that p if and only if p, for all values of x and all substituends of 
'p.' Formally, 
/" Sl (x) (Ox -+ (Bxp <--> p» 
which says no more than that an omniscient being believes all and only what is the 
case. Assuming 'Og' ('God is omniscient'), it follows from Sl that 
S2 Bgp <--> P 
for all substituends of 'p.' If we assume that a given substituends of 'p' is false, 
we write '-p.' This, together with S2 yields, '-Bgp' (i.e., 'It is not the case that 
God believes thatp'). Moreover, if we substitute '-p' for 'p' in S2 the result is 
S3 Bg-p <--> -p 
/ S2 and S3 together yield 
/ S4 Bg-p <--> -Bgp 
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So at first blush, it appears that 'God believes that' is a truth-functional operator 
for regimented English sentences, provided that God is omniscient. If p is true, 
then and only then does God believe that p; for an omniscient being does not 
believe what is false. On the other hand if p is false, then it is not true that God 
believes that p and God believes that p is false. So God believes that p if and 
only if p. It would appear then that the crux of the matter is whether or not God 
is omniscient. It is the purpose of this essay to examine a paradox which purports 
to show that God is not omniscient; or, rather, that there is no omniscient being. 
Consider the sentence 
(A) - (God believes that (A) is true) 
The argument purports to show that (A) is a true sentence. 2 To make the following 
deduction clear let us note that '(A)' is a name for the sentence 'God does not 
believe that (A) is true.' [I use 'A' as an abbreviation of (A).] The argument 
proceeds by way of a reductio. 
-A assumption 
2 --God believes that (A) is true by replacement of 'A' in 1 
3 God believes that (A) is true 2, double negation 
4 God believes that (A) is true +-> (A) is true replacing 'p' in S2 
with '(A) is true' 
5 (A) is true 3,4 
6 A if and only if (A) is true principle of semantics 
7 A 5,6 
8 -A-4A 1-7 by conditional proof 
9 A from 8 
10 (A) is true From 9 and same principle 
as employed in 6 
Hence, although (A) is true, God does not believe it is true. Hence God is not 
omniscient. He fails to believe at least one true claim. 
Since the sort of explicit self-reference employed in (A) may be thought to 
be unacceptable in the formulation of the paradox let us rewrite (A) as 
(A') God does not believe that the sentence appearing on lines 89 and 
90 of Stenner's word processor in the file headed by 'Noter13' is true. 
Anyone who takes the trouble to go to that particular file will discover that (A') 
is the sentence which appears on lines 89 and 90 of Stenner's word processor 
in the file headed by 'Noter13.' So it follows that God does not believe that 
(A') is true. It follows that the paradoxical consequence follows just as surely 
from this revised version as from the first. 
Those familiar with Tarski's work may immediately object that the paradox 
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is dependent on a faulty assumption, namely, that it is possible for a language 
to contain its own semantical principles. The truth predicate for a language (if 
that language is to be free of semantical paradoxes) must belong, not to that 
language, but to a semantical metalanguage in which we can describe the seman-
tical properties of that language (that is, the object language). 
We might, therefore, attempt to reconstruct the paradox by simply removing 
the phrase 'is true' so that we now get 
(A") God does not believe the sentence appearing on lines 108 and 109 
of Stenner's word processor in the filed labeled 'Noter13'. 
Again the paradoxical consequence follows. 
But an objection to this formulation might be that I am cheating; for the 
sentence implicitly says of itself that God cannot believe that it is true. While I 
am not quite sure of what "implicit saying" comes to I will not press this point. 
Rather I want to show that another argument can be constructed employing three 
languages, Ll, L2, and L3 related as follows: L2 is the semantic metalanguage 
for Ll, L3 is the semantic metalanguage for L2, and Ll is the semantic metalan-
guage for L3. Consequently, the truth predicate for each of these languages 
appears in its respective metalanguage. (I shall not at this point go through the 
mechanics of formulating formation rules for the respective languages but will 
assume that this can be done with little difficulty in the traditional way.) Now 
consider the following set of statements: 
1. No omniscient being believes that sentence 3 is true-in-L3. 
2. Sentence I is true-in-Ll. 
3. Sentence 2 is true-in-L2. 
Not only does this set of statements not violate any clearly defensible semantical 
principles, but each of the sentences is true in its respective language! We argue 
as follows: Suppose I is false-in-Ll. Then some omniscient being believes that 
sentence 3 is true-in-L3. But then such a being must believe that sentence 2 is 
true-in-L2 since sentence 3 says it is true-in-L2. Hence the omniscient being in 
question must believe that sentence 1 is true-in-Ll since sentence 2 says it is 
true-in-Ll. Sentence 1 must then be true since it is believed by an omniscient 
being to be true. But then our initial assumption that some omniscient being 
believes that 3 is true-in-L3 is false. Hence 1 is true-in-L 1. There are thus true 
sentences which no omniscient being believes to be true. The argument is perfectly 
general with respect to omniscient beings and in no way depends on the assump-
tion that God is omniscient. Consequently the conclusion is that there is no 
omniscient being. Strangely enough, each of us non-omniscient beings can believe 
that 1 through 3 are one and all true in their respective languages. 
306 Faith and Philosophy 
II 
In the remainder of this paper I examine various ways the paradox can be 
challenged and determine the effectiveness of such challenges. In this section I 
want to consider some objections which trade upon certain logico-semantic fea-
tures of paradoxes. First, one might attempt to argue that the system of languages, 
L l-L3, constitutes a circular set and that it can easily be shown that such circularity 
can result in semantic paradox just as easily as can a simplistic version of the 
liar's paradox. For example, 
A. Sentence C. is true-in-L3. 
B. Sentence A. is true-in-Ll. 
C. Sentence B. is false-in-L2. 
To show that this set of sentences and hence the set of languages of which they 
are a part is inconsistent we simply show in a metalanguage, L4, containing 
Ll-L3 as sublanguages, that sentence B is both true-in-L2 and false-in-L2. We 
argue as follows: If B is true-in-L2 then A is true-in-Ll. And if A is true-in-Ll 
it will follow that C is also true-in-L3 and B is false-in-L2. So if B is true-in-U 
it is false-in-L2. But then it is false-in-L2. But if it is false-in-L2 then so is A 
false-in-Ll and C false-in-L3. But if C is false-in-L3, then B is true-in-L2. So 
if B is false-in-L2, then it is true-in-L2; and hence it is true-in-L2. Sentence B 
is then both true-in-L2 and false-in-L2. So insofar as the languages Ll, L2, and 
L3 function as semantic metalanguages in this circular fashion we have shown 
that they are inconsistent. It follows that any set of languages constructed in 
such a circular fashion can be shown to be inconsistent in precisely the way in 
which Ll, L2, and L3 constitute an inconsistent set. It is not surprising therefore 
that sentences 1-3 should result in the conclusion that there is no omniscient 
being since the languages in which they are formulated will turn out to be 
inconsistent. 
I think that this argument is based on a flawed analogy between the case of 
an omniscient being and the case just mentioned. The two cases are actually 
quite different, the first one involving a veridical paradox, the second a falsidical 
paradox. 3 The first consists of demonstrably true sentences, the second gives 
rise to a contradiction and consequently not all of the sentences A, B, and C 
are true. The conclusion to the first of the paradoxes is surprising but it remains 
to be seen whether this paradox of omniscience contains a logical flaw or employs 
an unsatisfactory principle of inference. What I am arguing in particular is that 
the paradox generated by sentences 1-3 is entitled to be classified with the 
veridical paradoxes such as Godel's incompleteness results rather than with the 
antinomies such as the liar's paradox. Whereas A, B, and C are demonstrably 
incapable of all coming out true together, it is demonstrable that I, 2, and 3 are 
PARADOX OF OMNISCIENCE 307 
not merely jointly consistent but that each is true! Moreover, if an omniscient 
being is one who knows of each true sentence of a language that it is true in 
that language, then there are no omniscient beings. For no omniscient being can 
know that each of sentences 1, 2, and 3 is true in its respective language, 
assuming that warranted belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. 
For the sake of the argument, however, let us suppose that it is possible to 
generate an inconsistency from the sentences of languages Ll, L2, and L3. The 
question then is this: how does this fact have any bearing on the argument 
concerning omniscience? Ordinary English can be shown to be inconsistent by 
a similar set of arguments. But this does not prevent us from saying true things 
in English, even true things about the semantic properties of English sentences. 
What Tarski showed is not that we cannot say anything about the semantics of 
English in English, but merely that if we try to formulate a complete semantic 
theory for English in English, then paradox can be generated in that language. 
Similarly if we try to construct L 1 in such a way as to provide a complete 
semantical metalanguage for L3, and try to do the same for Ll and L2, we shall 
be able to generate the kind of paradox noted above with respect to A-C. But 
our argument for the non-existence of an omniscient being need not make such 
presuppositions at all. For example, we may so construct Ll that it contains 
only sentences asserting what individuals believe about the sentences of language 
L3. I doubt that any contradiction, such as the version of the liar's paradox just 
remarked, could be generated in such a triad of languages although I have no 
knock-down argument to prove it. The important point, however, is that I have 
just shown that the three sentences which establish the nonexistence of an omnis-
cient being are one and all true in their respective languages. So even though a 
semantic paradox could be generated in such a triad of languages this possibility 
in itself cannot be grounds for holding that every semantic claim made within 
these languages is false or paradoxical. 
Another method of criticizing the paradox is to attack the argument for the 
conclusion by noting that I have failed to specify the formation rules for L 1 
through L3 and concluding that it is not at all clear whether the three languages 
constitute an inconsistent triad or not. Moreover, until I provide a set of formation 
rules for each of the elements of the triad, I am in no position to argue that 
semantic paradox is not forthcoming from the triad. This objection can be rebutted 
by noting that L 1 through L3 consists of just a subset of sentences from regimented 
English. Insofar as we understand English we can understand these English 
sentences and "grasp" what they say. My argument (which presumably takes 
place in L4, another subset of sentences from regimented English) supposes that 
these subsets can be specified in a consistent way. As long as the sentences of 
L I are limited to statements of belief, I see no way in which the sort of contradic-
tion generated with respect to sentences A, B, and C can be generated in the 
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case of languages Ll-L3, provided that Ll be restricted to statements about what 
rational agents can believe about statements formulated in sentences of L3. Of 
course this may be just blindness on my part. But even if such contradictions 
can be generated, this presumed state of affairs has no obvious bearing on the 
question whether the paradox in question involves a contradiction and whether 
such contradiction is somehow dependent on the question of the formation rules 
for Ll through L3. 
III 
A second objection might go as follows: given the referential opacity of belief 
contexts, it is not immediately obvious whether the appropriate semantic connec-
tions can be developed formally in languages like Ll through L3.4 Although a 
complete analysis of belief contexts would surely be a welcome philosophical 
breakthrough, nothing of this order seems to be required in the present cir-
cumstances. What is needed is justification for the schema, S 1, which "unpacks" 
the notion of an omniscient being to the extent of specifying a necessary condition 
for the term 'omniscient being' to be applicable at all. It simply requires that 
the result of replacing 'p' in S 1 by some true or false regimented sentence of 
English will always result in a true generalization. Since an omniscient being is 
generally held to believe only what is true, the aforementioned requirement 
seems hardly to be objectionable. One might choose to specify knowledge rather 
than belief as a necessary condition for omniscience on the ground that an 
omniscient being is to be characterized as knowing what is true rather than merely 
believing what is true. A paradox similar to the one generated by sentences 1 
through 3 can be created by replacing 'believes that' by 'knows that.' But if 
belief constitutes a necessary condition for knowledge then this particular route 
seems unnecessary. Suffice it to say that the generation of the paradox clearly 
depends on the adequacy of S 1 and no more appears to be required by way of 
analysis of belief contexts, for current purposes, than its justification. 
Before turning to other issues, I wish to make a few additional comments 
concerning the semantic principles employed in the languages Ll-L3. One of 
Tarski's strictures, i.e., not allowing a language to contain all of its own semantic 
principles, is clearly not something that one discovers by an empirical investiga-
tion. 5 Rather we make a decision to use a certain linguistic framework for 
whatever purposes we have in mind. In Russell's case the decision was made 
in order to avoid certain paradoxes. We currently adopt Tarski's methods for 
similar reasons-the avoidance of paradox and, more generally, avoidance of 
inconsistency deriving from whatever semantic source. It therefore would fall 
to those who wish to hold that there is in fact one omniscient being to show that 
Ll-L3 are languages in which it is not possible to carry on cognitive inquiry or 
PARADOX OF OMNISCIENCE 309 
that true statements cannot be made in these languages and that hence there is 
a critical flaw in the argument presented in this paper. Nor will it do to claim 
that sentences 1 through 3 are cognitively meaningless, i.e., neither true nor 
false, for I have just shown that there appears to be a sound argument to the 
conclusion that all three of the sentences are true. 6 
I have assumed, throughout this discussion that what 'belief' means as applied 
to omniscient beings is the same as when applied to ordinary mortals. Although 
extended discussion of metaphorical and analogical language as applied to deity 
is not possible here7 , there are some general comments concerning the analysis 
of belief contexts as applied to deity which should be made with respect to this 
assumption. The expression 'believe' does not wear its logical syntax on its 
sleeve; consequently, there are several options available to us. We can treat 
belief as a relation, or treat 'believe' as part of a logical operator or as a part of 
a predicate. In discussing the problem of the logical syntax of belief sentences 
I shall continue in this paper to adopt the view that 'belief' and its cognates as 
applied to deity are best understood in the literal sense of the term. Following 
suggestions made by Israel Scheffler concerning a way of analyzing belief 
sentences, I begin by examining the following: 
God believes gold is malleable if and only if God believes-true the 
sentence 'Gold is malleable'. 
Here 'belief' is not treated as a relational term but rather as a part of a relational 
term, 'believes-true,' a term which holds between persons and sentences of a 
language. Scheffler thus is able to bypass some of the thorny psychological 
issues involving belief and believing. One objection that has been raised to this 
sort of analysis, at least as regards ordinary mortals, is that it requires a conditional 
rather than a biconditional "definition," namely, "If P believes-true the sentence, 
'Gold is malleable,' then P believes gold is malleable." The converse fails for 
those who are unable to read, speak, or understand English. Scheffler's analysis 
then provides only a sufficient and not a necessary condition for belief sentences. 
But this criticism is irrelevant to our inquiry since an omniscient being believes-
true all and only the true sentences of every language. 
To avoid needless complications, I consider only eternal sentences of 
regimented English of the Quinean sort as permissible substituends of 'p.' While 
biconditionals of the following sort 
God believes it is raining if and only if God believes-true the sentence, 
'11 pleut' 
are apparently harmless, they may lead to needless complications for the discus-
sion and will consequently be ignored. 
Another criticism that allegedly threatens Scheffler's analysis is ambiguity. If 
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an ambiguous sentence occurs as the second relatum of a belief sentence as thus 
construed, then the sentence's truth-value may depend crucially on whether the 
sentence is construed as true or construed as false. This difficulty may be remedied 
by considering only belief sentences involving the deity in which an eternal 
sentence constitutes the second relatum.9 Although Scheffler's account may prove 
to be unsatisfactory as a general analysis of belief sentences, for the sorts of 
problems addressed in this paper it appears to be perfectly adequate, since none 
of the standard criticisms have any bearing on the problems at hand. 
I think it is clear, therefore, that the claim that the paradox is due somehow 
to a faulty (because unexplicated) notion of belief is seen to be without basis. 
IV 
In this section I examine an attempt to save the doctrine of God's omniscience 
from the paradoxes by distinguishing between knowing that p and knowing that 
someone knows that p. 
Something like omniscience can perhaps be rescued from the paradox of 
omniscience by considering that there does not seem to be anything incompatible 
with God's knowing that each of us (who does in fact know that 1-3 is true) 
knows that 1-3 is true, unless we assume that the following principle holds 
universally: 
If A knows that B knows that p, then A knows that p 
But this principle can be shown to be untenable if assumed to be held without 
qualification. 10 Consider the following sentence 
D. A. J. Stenner III cannot know that this sentence is true. 
While I am incapable of knowing that D is true, I am assuming that you know 
it is true even though you may never have met the author of this essay. So it 
appears that I know that you the reader knows that D. is true. But it is clear that 
I do not know that D. is true even though "I know that D" follows from the 
transitivity principle and the claim that I know that you know that D. Yet I seem 
to know something about D. What is it that I know? What is interesting is that 
I seem to be able to know something which I clearly cannot know. There is a 
puzzle here and it is a puzzle which also afflicts the paradox of omniscience. 
What these remarks seem to suggest is that there are two distinct senses of 
'know,' one in which I cannot know that D. is true and one in which I can know 
it. The one way we may refer to as direct knowledge and the other as indirect 
knowledge. Similarly, although an omniscient being cannot directly know that 
the troublesome sentence is true, an omniscient being can indirectly know it via 
the transitivity of the knowledge relation (if indeed the knowledge relation is 
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transitive in the sense intended). What this suggestion amounts to is this: if A 
directly knows that B directly knows that p, then A indirectly knows that p. We 
may now attempt to characterize omniscience as follows: 
x is omniscient if and only if for every true statement, S, x directly 
knows that S is true or x indirectly knows that S is true. 
We can now characterize knowing as direct or indirect. So a shortened version 
of the definition of omniscience will be 
x is omniscient if and only if for all true statements, S, x knows that 
S is true 
where 'know' is understood as characterized above. Before we examine the 
question whether omniscience is logically possible and whether the doctrine of 
God's omniscience can be rescued from the paradoxes, there are some other 
complicating factors to be taken into account. First of all, there are infinitely 
many paradoxes of the sort we have been considering. To establish this we need 
note only that the circle of languages involved can be expanded to n languages, 
for any positive integer, n. Of course not all of these have been actually inscribed 
and they exist only in the sense that, analogously, there are infinitely many 
sentences in English and infinitely many truth-functions in the truth-functional 
logic. Now the problem is this: the notion of indirect knowing depends on there 
being a person (rational agent), P, other than God, who directly knows the 
statement in question is true. Assuming that there is some finite upper bound to 
the number of languages a finite rational being can handle and comprehend, 
there will always be a paradox involving a number of languages greater than 
any finite rational being could handle and comprehend. It would seem to follow 
that (past, present, and future) there will be infinitely many paradoxical statements 
of the sort under consideration that God cannot know even in the indirect sense 
since there are no rational agents who directly know that the paradoxical statement 
is true. II There are two immediately obvious ways out of this difficulty, each 
carrying a price tag. One way requires the use of counterfactual conditionals. 
God indirectly knows S is true just in case if there were a rational agent P who 
knew that S is true, God would directly know that P knew that S is true. I 
perhaps need not comment on the difficulties attending counterfactual specifica-
tion of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
A second way (to which the first way is reducible on accounts such as those 
of David Lewis)12 requires the existence of possible beings who, in their own 
possible worlds, directly know that S is true. On this account God indirectly 
knows that S is true provided there is a possible rational agent, P, who directly 
knows that S is true. Thus we need to distinguish between 
(i) In w, P knows that Socrates failed to drink the hemlock in w 
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and 
(ii) In w, P knows that Socrates drank the hemlock in the actual world. 
where 'w' denotes a possible but non-actual world. An agent that knows (i) and 
(ii) presumably does not have contradictory beliefs. Both (i) and (ii) are true. 
As far as the paradoxes are concerned, however, only (ii) is relevant. The way 
we want (i) and (ii) to cash out is that if God knows that (i) is true, God knows 
indirectly that it is possible that Socrates failed to drink the hemlock.13 And if 
God knows (ii) is true, then God indirectly knows that Socrates drank the hemlock. 
Have the paradoxes been circumvented? Unfortunately not. It can easily be 
proved that this modal retreat is inadequate as a way out. To see that this is the 
case let us first define 'know' as follows: 
Def. x knows that p = df. x indirectly knows that p or 
x directly knows that p 
The proof at the end of section I of this paper may be reconstructed by replacing 
'believes' (or a grammatical variant thereof) wherever it occurs in that proof 
with 'knows' (or by appropriate grammatical variants) beginning with its occurr-
ence in sentence 1. The proof goes through as easily as does the original as the 
reader may attest by carrying out the reconstruction. 
The consequence then is that there are no omniscient beings since 
1'. No omniscient being knows that sentence 3 is true-in-L3. 
So the distinction between direct and indirect knowledge has not enabled us to 
avoid the paradoxical conclusion. 
v. 
Since our logico-semantic excursus has not provided a satisfactory solution to 
the paradox of omniscience let us tum our attention in a different direction. 
There is a feature of paradoxes of omniscience which is shared with some of 
the paradoxes of omnipotence. It is this: in each case the paradox is created by 
devising a game which the other player cannot win except by cheating or by 
trading upon some disability (e.g., exhaustion) of the other player. Suppose we 
ask, "Can God win a game of tick-tack-toe against a knowledgeable player?" 
Before we try to answer this question let us look at some of the complicating 
factors. First of all, since God neither slumbers nor sleeps, He has an advantage 
over ordinary players who, because of their humanity, are in need of sleep, food, 
drink, etc. If it were possible for an omnipotent being to play tick-tack-toe with 
a finite rational being, the obvious answer to the question is "Yes." All the 
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omnipotent being would need to do in order to win is to wait until the opponent 
dropped from exhaustion, was awakened to make the next move and made a 
stupid blunder of the sort that usually accompanies such disability. But this 
surely says nothing for the omnipotence (or lack of it) for one of the players. 
Let us then rather construct a scenario of a slightly different sort. The question 
then is, "Can an omnipotent being win a game of tick-tack-toe against a machine 
(such as a computer) programmed to play the best strategy and kept in optimal 
working condition?" The answer to this question is clearly in the negative. The 
phrase 'kept in optimal working condition' in the phrasing of the question is 
important; for it prevents the pulling of the plug, for example, as a device for 
winning. What we want is an ethical strategy for winning of the sort appropriate 
to deity. So long as the opponent is omnibenevolent, or at least meets the 
standards for omnibenevolence as is necessary to play the game in question, 
there can be no winner, since tick-tack-toe is a game for which there can be no 
winner if both players employ the optimum strategy. 
There is a clear analogy here to those paradoxes of omnipotence (e.g., the 
paradox of the stone) in which the conditions of "contest" are such that there 
cannot be a winner. In the case of the paradox of the stone the difficulty arises 
from logical presuppositions in the formulation of the problem. If God's winning 
in such a case is to create a stone so large that he cannot lift it, then He cannot 
win. That is, if He creates such a stone, he demonstrates that he is not omnipotent 
since he has created something over which he lacks control. 14 In the paradox of 
omniscience there is no faulty presupposition assumed in the formulation of the 
issues, but it is logically impossible for there to be a winner. Whether this shows 
that the paradox of omniscience, like the paradox of the stone, has no relevant 
bearing on the question of divine omniscience (or omnipotence) is something 
the reader will have to decide. 
Those who wish to appeal to the doctrine of analyticity might employ the 
following formulation of the solution: If the conditions of contest entail there 
being no winner, then the game in question has no bearing whatsoever on the 
question of the omniscience of the deity. The claim that God can win at a game 
of tick-tack-toe under the conditions just described is a counteranalytic proposi-
tion. Counteranalyticity, on this view, is just a broader category than that of 
logical impossibility. And the principle that says that omnipotence remains unaf-
fected by logical impossibility holds likewise for counteranalyticity. 15 Whether 
this sort of move provides a satisfactory solution to the paradoxes of omniscience 
of the sort we have just examined is a question I am not at this time prepared 
to answer. I have not, of course, attempted to answer the question whether God 
is omnipotent or omniscient. This issue, it seems to me, at least insofar as the 
analytic-synthetic distinction makes any sense at all, is one that is purely synthetic 
and demands a synthetic solution. 
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VI 
Two further sorts of moves might be tried in an attempt to avoid the paradoxical 
conclusion of the argument under discussion in this paper. The first is to deny 
that sentences have truth-values and argue that it is only propositions or statements 
which have truth-values. I believe it is perfectly easy to construct the paradoxes 
on these assumptions but I leave that task to those for whom the enterprise 
suggests a better solution than the ones I have considered. A second and more 
important way out involves rejection of the principle of bi-valence. An analysis 
of the sort I have in mind would result from employing a three-valued logic and 
semantics. Sentences like 1-3 could then take values other than truth and falsity. 
The arguments developed in meta-metalanguage, L4, are based on the assumption 
that the semantics in question are two-valued. Can an argument to the same 
conclusion be constructed by replacing 'false-in-Ll' by 'false-in-Ll or indeter-
minate-in-Ll' where 'indeterminate in Ll' simply denotes the third value with 
similar replacements being made for L2 and L3? While I have no conclusive 
argument one way or the other, some considerations now lead me to believe that 
the paradoxes cannot be generated when the semantics of Ll-L3 are three-valued. 
I want to briefly discuss some of the relevant considerations. First of all each 
of the paradoxes has been generated by the method of indirect proof. This method 
is not available in a three-valued logic nor is the schema, 'p v -p' obtainable 
as a theorem in those three-valued systems with which I am familiar. I have 
been unable to discover a proof of the paradoxes which does not depend in some 
crucial way on the method of indirect proof. 
To see why it is unlikely that such a proof can be found, let me take the most 
direct tack available. I shall employ a two-valued logic in L4 and assume that 
Ll-L3 are languages with three-valued semantics. The "truth-table" for three-









Here the third value is construed as indeterminacy. The dash (rather than the 
tilde) is employed to distinguish this three-valued function from ordinary negation 
expressed by '-p.' The other functions are irrelevant to the argument and won't 
be defined here. Intuitions which justify this definition of three-valued "negation" 
are summed up as follows: if a statement is indeterminate then so is its negation, 
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and vice versa. The relations of truth and falsity with respect to detenninate 
sentences remains the same as in two-valued semantics. In order to apply our 
two-valued logic to the problem at hand we need to employ the tilde instead of 
the dash, i.e., we need two-valued negation rather than its three-valued counter-
part. Unfortunately '-' is not definable in terms of '-.' But we can characterize 
'-' in tenns of the three-valued system as follows: 
'-S' is true just in case S is either false or indetenninate. 16 
We now proceed to construct the argument for the paradoxes as before. The 
conclusion in the one case is 
-(3x) (Ox & BxS3 is true-in-L3) 
and in the other case 
-(3x) (Ox & KxS3 is true-in-L3) 
But the force of the paradox has been clearly diminished; for we can no longer 
conclude that the claims that Ox) (Ox & BxS3 is true-in-L3) and that (]x) (Ox 
& KxS3 is true-in-L3) are each false but only that they are either false or 
indetenninate. 
A slightly different account would read 'I' as meaning indeterminable rather 
than as indeterminate, the fonner focusing on the limitations of our methods of 
inquiry, the latter having a more "realistic" flavor. The results, however, are 
the same: the sharpness of the paradoxical conclusion has been blunted. 
What I have shown in this paper is that there are various methods for attempting 
to cope with paradoxes, more specifically with the paradoxes of omniscience. 
Some of these, such as those which issue in attacks on the formal or semantic 
properties of the premises of the argument, are quite wide of the mark and seem 
to me to be satisfying neither to the philosopher nor to the person of faith. 
Whether the approach requiring a rejection of the principle of bi-valence is 
religiously satisfying is a question I shall leave to others. 
The question with which I began was this: Is the expression 'God believes 
that ' a truth-functional operator? As a device for titillation it 
perhaps succeeds. But in spite of initial reactions to the contrary, and for reasons 
adumbrated in this paper, theologically inclined logicians are best advised to 
look elsewhere for a logical basis for their truth-functional theories. 
Washington University 
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NOTES 
I. A slightly different version of this paper was delivered to a philosophy colloquium at Washington 
University, March 27, 1986. I am grateful to Richard A. Watson for helpful suggestions and for turning 
some questionable syntactical constructions into English sentences. I also would like to thank the editor 
of this journal and a referee of this paper for a number of helpful criticisms and comments. 
2. We could have taken as our sentence-frame 'God believes that p' with the understanding that the 
relative 'that' occur as a nominalizing operator on 'p.' In this case 'p' would be treated as a variable 
ranging over propositions rather than as a schematic letter. The relative 'that' would then be taken as 
part of the nominalizing expression, i.e .. as part of the expression naming a proposition rather than as 
part of the predicate fonning operator 'believes that.' Those who take propositions to be objects of 
belief may construe 'p' as a quantifiable variable rather than as a schematic letter as I take itto be. There 
appears, however, to be no particular point in belaboring the distinction between a quantifiable vari-
able and a schematic letter at this point. Whatever interpretation of 'p' we adopt, the argument for the 
paradox goes through as usual. 
3. The terms 'veridical' and 'falsidical' as applied to paradoxes appear to have been introduced by 
Quine. See the title essay in his Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1964). 
4. I am unable to provide such an analysis and perhaps it is not beside the point to say a brief word 
about the difficulties involved. There appear to be two sorts of theories which attempt to explicate be-
lief in a formal way. The first treats beliefs as propositions or meanings, posited to explain the nature of 
belief and relations among beliefs. The second sort is also of two sub-species: those which keep 
'believes' as a relational tenn and those which treat it as either part of a predicate applied to persons or 
perhaps part of an operator. Theories which posit propositions and meanings are the results of attempts 
to avoid the difficulties attendant upon the inscriptional approach of the sort advocated by Israel Scheftler 
and others. But is is not clearthat adopting an analysis of belief contexts which posits intentional entities 
avoids the possibility that the unwanted conclusion may not arise for other reasons. The inscriptional 
approach, while avoiding certain problems posed the positing of meanings or propositions, fails to pro-
vide a completely general account which allows for differences in languages. For example, it cannot 
handle even the simplest case of utterances of statements of belief such as 'John Claude believes it is 
snowing' on the occasion of the French-speaking, non-English-speaking Jean Claude tramping through 
the streets of Montreal in the midst of a blizzard. In other words, the inscriptional approach is language 
relative. These are one and all difficult issues and I have no answerto any of them. I am not attempting 
to ignore the issues raised by the attempts to construct a fomlal semantic theory which at the same time 
can handle belief sentences. What I am suggesting is that our inability to construct such a theory is 
irrelevant to the question of whether we can tell that sentences 1, 2, and 3 are one and all true. Notice 
that we can construct a similar paradox by rewriting sentence 1 as 1 a, namely 'Georg Cantor cannot 
believe-true that sentence 3 is true in L3' although everyone of the rest of us can clearly tell that the now 
revised set 1 a-3 contains only true sentences. So the paradox is clearly not dependent on the notion of 
omniscience, except to the extent that omniscient beings are supposed to believe all and only true sen-
tences. A few more comments on the nature of such theories follows shortly in the body of the text. 
S. Russell apparently held the view that one could in fact discover such principles in a metaphysical 
inquiry. At least he seems to have held such a view with respect to his theory of types. Camap, 
also, although he despised metaphysical speCUlation, and even though he protested with respect to 
other sorts of issues that such matters merely involve a choice oflanguage framework, was apparently 
horns woggled into believing that type theory was a true description of how things are in the universe. 
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6. Later in this paper I discuss the suggestion that the principle of bi-valence is at fault. At this 
particular point in the discussion I am not concerned to discuss or debate the pros and cons of 
mathematical intuitionism and three-valued logic but merely to distinguish these views from the 
view that any sentence which is cognitively meaningless is neither true or false. 
7. Several issues and problems, although relevant to the matters discussed in the text, require more 
space than is available in this paper. Nevertheless, their brief mention is perhaps not out of order 
here. First of all, it is clear that belief language concerning deity can be understood metaphorically 
or analogically as well as literally. It would be appropriate therefore to show that the paradox is 
generated under a metaphorical or analogical interpretation of belief as well as a literal one. Until 
this has been done for the sentences in question, it may be objected that I have not clearly shown 
that God cannot believe all true sentences. 
I am convinced that whether 'belief' is understood literally or not, the paradox in question is still 
generable. Reasoned support for this conviction is too extended to be included in this paper, and 
perhaps may be taken up at a later date. 
Paul Tillich was an eminent advocate of the view that only non-literal language is truly applicable 
to deity. See his Systematic Theology, Univ. of Chi. Press, vol. 1, Chicago, llIinois, 1951, p. 239. 
"God is Being-itself or the absolute. However, after this has been said, nothing else can be said 
about God as God which is not symbolic." To be a symbolic assertion, for Tillich, is to be, among 
other things, non-literal. He seldom if ever speaks of metaphor or metaphorical language. This, I 
believe, is due to the fact that the metaphor-literal dichotomy makes a cut in the uses of expressions 
at a different point than does the symbol-sign dichotomy with which Tillich was concerned. As with 
the metaphor-literal distinction I doubt that treating religious language as symbolic will avoid the 
paradoxes under discussion. My reasons, unfortunately, cannot be elaborated in the present paper. 
8. See his Anatomy (If Inquiry, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963, pp. 88-110. Another of 
Scheffler's papers, "An Inscriptional Approach to Indirect Quotation," Analysis, vol. 14, 1954, pp. 
83-90, is also relevant to the issues discussed here. 
9. An eternal sentence is characterized by Quine as one whose truth-value remains the same in 
every context. Such a sentence is constructed by eschewing all indexical expressions in favor of 
definite descriptions and then removing the definite descriptions according to the Quine-Russell 
method. Simple ambiguities along with any amphibolies are likewise eliminated. 
10. A principle suggested by Hector Neri Castaneda in dealing with a similar problem surely fails 
here. This principle he states as follows: 
If a sentence of the form 'X knows that a person Y knows that ... ' formulates a true state-
ment, then the person X knows the statement formulated by the clause filling the blank' ... ' 
While Castaneda is well aware of possible counterexamples to his principle, the ones he cites all 
have to do with problems of indicator expressions such as 'I' and 'he himself.' For the other cases 
he seems to suggest the detachment is legitimate. He says, '''Jones knows that Smith knows that 
2+5=7' does entail 'Jones knows that 2+5=7.'" Is his principle suppose to hold, then, for all 
statements lacking indicator expressions? The paradoxes under discussion in this paper suggest 
otherwise. See his "Omniscience and Indexical Reference," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64, no. 7, 
p.207. 
It should be clear at the outset that use of this principle will require that 'p' take as substituends 
only eternal sentences. Also, indirect discourse, as usual, gives headaches. Again caution is required 
in trying to nominalize a sentence and to use the resulting nominalization in place of 'that p.' 
Although I may know that you know where you parked your car, it doesn't follow that I know 
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where you parked your car. But where 'p' takes as substituend an eternal sentence, there is no 
immediately obvious reason why the transitivity principle should be inoperative for the "ordinary" 
range of cases. We shall see, however, that even making this distinction does nothing to circumvent 
the paradoxes. 
11. For the religious believer whose religious posits include angels, this particular issue need not 
pose an irremediable problem, provided, of course that angels likewise have infinite capacities to 
comprehend paradoxical arguments. 
12. See his Counterfactuals, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1973. 
13. The referee mentioned earlier objected that a possible person is not an actual person and hence 
given the problem at hand, God would not know the paradoxical conclusion even indirectly because 
there would be no second person whose knowledge could be appealed to. This is certainly true of 
several treatments of possible worlds semantics but is not true of every such treatment. David Lewis 
in particular holds that possible worlds are real in some not too outre' sense of that much abused 
expression. I would suppose that this sense of the reality of possible worlds would apply, in Lewis' 
treatment, to the denizens of such worlds. 
14. Since this paradox is of the form of a dilemma, the negation of this claim (i.e., it is not the 
case that God can create a stone so large He can't lift it) must likewise lead to the conclusion that 
God lacks omnipotence, if the argument is to be valid. But the logical structure of the negation does 
not imply the wanted conclusion. As C. Wade Savage has convincingly argued, to say that it is not 
the case that God can create a stone so large that He can't lift it, is not to say that there is a task 
that God cannot perform. (See, "The Paradox of the Stone," The Philosophical Review, 76 (1967), 
pp. 74-79. Reprinted in Baruch Brody, (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 345-49.) Moreover, this negation is perfectly consistent with 
the claim that God can create stones of any poundage and can lift stones of any poundage. Of course 
it is clear for finite beings that there are tasks of lifting and creating which are beyond our ability. 
The logical error in the case of divinity is to suppose that one can extrapolate from finite cases to 
infinite cases and to suppose further that since if we cannot do both A and B we are not omnipotent, 
then if God cannot do both A and B, he likewise is not omnipotent. Our inability to do something 
may constitute an inability on our part to perform a particular task. But God's inability (speaking 
very loosely) to create a stone so large that He can't lift it, is not an inability to perform a particular 
task. Failure to appreciate the differences between finite and infinite collections has frequently given 
rise to paradoxes of this sort. They are resolved by getting clear on the difference. 
15. It is well known that this view is not universally accepted. Among the dissenters are Rene 
Descartes, Martin Luther, and John Calvin. These would each seem to hold that to say that God is 
unable to create a round square is to deny His omnipotence. The more reasonable view is that to 
claim that God cannot do what is logically impossible is to claim, not that there is a limit to what 
God can do, but rather that there is a limit to what constitutes an intelligible claim. It is a recognition 
of a limitation on our language rather than a recognition of a presumed limitation on the powers of 
deity that leads one to assert that God cannot do the impossible. Those who hold otherwise are not, 
as they suppose, upholding the divine mysteriousness of the creator but rather are simply showing 
that all such talk is utterly incoherent. I am not suggesting that such talk is cognitively meaningless. 
The difficulty attendant upon inconsistency is not too little meaning but too much. When I say that 
a claim is unintelligible what I mean is that it fails to fulfill the principal function of cognitive 
discourse: to distinguish what is the case from what is not the case. When I call a claim incoherent, 
I simply mean that there is no consistent interpretation of the sentence(s) making the claim (given 
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certain minimal assumptions concerning the use ofthe expressions of which the sentence is composed). 
To say, then, that the claim that God can create a square circle is incoherent and unintelligible is 
not to claim that it is cognitively meaningless. It is of course possible for a sentence or a string of 
expressions of a language to be unintelligible, incoherent, and cognitively meaningless. I am suggest-
ing, however, that one ought not to infer cognitive meaninglessness from incoherence or unintelligi-
bility. 
I follow Quine in treating analytic sentences as those obtainable from logical truths by replacing 
synonym for synonym. Counteranalytic sentences are obtainable from logical falsehoods by replacing 
synonym for synonym. On this usage the set of counteranalytic sentences includes the set of logically 
impossible sentences. 
16. The single quotes in the formula are to be read in this occurrence as Quinean corners with'S' 
occurring as quantitiable variable. 
